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questioned conduct of our hypothetical attorneys
is the conduct of lawyers acting in a strictly representative capacity.
These men are to commence or prosecute actions or to plead defenses.
Except in the case of Mary Smith's administrator, the rights and powers
here to be exercised are given by the law, not to the attorneys themselves,
but to their clients. The attorneys, as agents, are to exercise the legal
rights and powers of their clients-they are to be, in the moralist's term,
cooperators in their clients' acts. Therefore the first step in the process
of evaluating morally the lawyers' concurring conduct must be to
establish the moral quality of the acts by which the clients exercise the
rights and powers given them by law.
EARLY ALL THE

The moral quality of the acts which the clients propose and in which
the attorneys are to cooperate will appear more clearly if we first describe the moral background of those acts, by establishing whether or
not the clients are morally obliged to forbear making the defenses,
bringing the actions, or employing the tactics suggested. The moral
obligations here pertinent may be examined in three stages. The
primary moral obligations are those which arise directly from natural
law. The secondary moral obligations are those which arise out of
just human laws, considered as precepts of the moral order. Then we
must consider whether, at the time the clients are to act, and the
attorneys to cooperate with them, some of the primary and secondary
moral obligations may have been extinguished.
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The Parties' Primary Moral Obligations
The primary moral obligations of Mary
Smith seem to be these. By her contract
with the White Co., she bound herself to
pay for the 1956 car upon certain terms;
by breaching that obligation, she may have
incurred an additional duty-to make good
the harm her act of breach unjustly caused
the Company. As far as natural law is
concerned, she might discharge these obligations by fulfilling the contract and compensating the Company's special damages
or, with the Company's consent, by returning the car and making whole the Company's loss on the entire transaction. Mary
Smith is similarly obliged to fulfill her
contract with Jane and to repair the harm
she caused Jane by breaching the contract.
Mary Smith is obliged to do what she can
to correct the false impression she has
given others in respect to Jane's character
and conduct. Further, she is obliged to repair or compensate the material damages
she unjustly and efficaciously caused by
slandering Jane.
John Jones is bound morally to pay the
balance of his mortgage debt, at least
$3,500, to the A.B.C. Inc. or to its successors. For any remedial right, such as a
power of sale, the A.B.C. must rely upon
the positive law, for the statement does not
indicate that Jones has created any such
right by special promise in the mortgage
instruments.
The Cola Corporation is morally obliged
to compensate the claimant of File B for
any damage its agents or employees, acting
with the knowledge and consent of the Corporation's responsible managers, caused
him unjustly, efficaciously, and with theo-

logical fault. The Corporation has, of
course, no such obligation to the claimants
of File A or File C.
The Parties' Secondary Moral Obligations
These are obligations which arise out of
human law. The legal obligations of just
laws become moral obligations in virtue of
the natural principle that binds men to live
in society and to pursue in their conduct
society's common good.
All human laws impose standards of conduct. Conduct which violates no legal standard is said to be legally permissible or, in
a negative and improper sense, it is called
lawful conduct. But properly speaking, conduct is lawful when it conforms to a legal
standard, and it is unlawful when it violates
such a standard. Even when they are used
properly, the terms lawful and unlawful
have different senses, which must be clearly
distinguished in reference to the problem
cases here examined.
Conduct is lawful or unlawful, in the
strict sense, if that conduct, as such, is commanded or forbidden by law. Although a
line of conduct, as such, is neither commanded nor forbidden by law, the conduct
may be called lawful or unlawful in a broad
but proper sense. In this sense, conduct is
lawful when the performance of the conduct is a condition precedent to the enjoyment of a legal right or to the imposition of
a legal obligation. Thus, for example, recording a deed is lawful conduct, not in the
strict sense that the conduct itself is a legal
obligation, but in the broader sense, that
the property interest represented by the
deed is given certain protections of the law
only when the deed conferring that interest
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is recorded. The law of penal or exemplary
damages imposes standards of conduct
directly, as such, whereas the law of compensatory damages imposes broader standards of conduct. This law does not forbid
negligence or breach of contract per se. But
when damage follows upon such breaches
of the legal standards of conduct, the person who violated the standards is obliged
by the law to "respond in damages."
Just laws, then enter into the moral order
and create moral obligations proportioned
to the legal duties those laws impose. Conduct commanded or forbidden as such by a
just law is, accordingly moral or immoral
conduct. Conduct which the law makes a
prerequisite to the imposition of a legal obligation is not, as such, moral or immoralit is a condition which must exist before the
law will create a moral obligation. Thus,
the laws which concern us in these hypotheticals-the laws of contract and tort
damages, the recording statutes, and the
laws which give actions for debt and for
foreclosure--establish standards of conduct
whose fulfillment or violation are conditions prerequisite to the incurring of legal
and moral obligations.
Anterior to any conduct in compliance
with or violative of the specific standards of
conduct established by these several laws, a
person who is legally subject to a civil jurisdiction has a moral duty to suffer the coercions lawfully and justly employed by that
authority to determine claims made under
its laws. This moral duty exists though the
claim made against him in a given case be
utterly baseless.
Mary Smith, upon violating the legal
standard of conduct imposed by the law of
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slander, with consequent harm to Jane, incurred a legal and moral obligation running
to Jane as well as to the state. The content
of this obligation is that Mary Smith must
suffer the coercion incidental to the lawful
process by which Jane may seek judgment
for damages. If such judgment should be
given justly against Mary, she would have
two further moral obligations-to pay the
successful plaintiff the damages decreed,
and to suffer the lawful coercion incidental
to execution of the judgment. We will later
show that Mary incurred no legal liability
by breaching her contracts.
John Jones, when he defaulted in his
mortgage payments, incurred secondary
moral duties in respect to the action for
debt and the foreclosure action. Jones was
bound by two further obligations created by
law. When his mortgagee complied with the
recording act, Jones became bound to suffer the record lien as an encumbrance upon
his title, and to use none but legal means
to clear his title of that encumbrance.
Although the claims against the Cola
Corporation represented by Files A and C
are without foundation in fact or in law, the
Cola Corporation has a moral duty to suffer the coercion incidental to lawful examination of those claims.
If those unjust claims should be finally
determined against the Corporation, it
would be morally obliged to satisfy the
judgments, but this duty would run to the
society only, and not to the claimants.
Unlawful resistance to, or evasion of, the
process of execution of the judgment would
be immoral, but would not deprive the
claimants of anything which strictly and
morally belonged to them.
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On the contrary, if the founded claim of
File B were justly and finally adjudicated
against the Corporation, its duty to pay the
judgment would run, not only to the civil
society, but to the claimant. Unlawful evasion of this duty would not only be immoral
in itself; it would leave the Corporation
with a moral duty to compensate the
claimant upon the terms of the judgment,
though lawful execution of the judgment
had been successfully evaded.
The Moral Effect of the Procedural
Laws Referred to in the Cola Case
These laws typify the laws which give
causes of action and govern the evolution
of actions. Such laws impose directly two
chief moral obligations-the party given
the action is bound to pursue his remedy in
accordance with the legal requirements of
procedure and proof, and the party defendant is bound to suffer the law's just coercion, not only in the eventual execution of
just judgment taken against him, but in the
lawful processes which enable the court
to examine and determine the claim. These
two duties do not directly alter the defendant's pre-existing moral duty to the claimant, if he have such a duty. If he is bound
in conscience to restore the other's property
or to repair or compensate the other's
damages, this obligation is in no direct way
altered by the law which gives to the
other a cause of action to enforce his
claim. The two duties directly created by
law may, however, affect the pre-existing
moral obligation indirectly. Absent the
law, the person obligated might have
had a choice of means with which to perform his moral duty of restitution, but the
intervention of the law may limit his choice.

A person who has, with theological fault, so
injured another as to cause loss of employment, for example, is obliged in conscience
to repair that loss. The person so obliged
might compensate, to the perfect satisfaction of natural justice, by a money payment,
or by persuading the former employer to
take back his servant, or by finding another
job for the person deprived. But when the
law threatens enforcement of damage compensation by no other means than money
payment, and the one injured will not save
the offending party from the law's menace
by giving a legal release in exchange for a
morally adequate reparation, the offending
party may postpone performance of his primary moral duty to make restitution. His
attempt to perform by means other than
money payment will not satisfy the law and,
though he pays the money morally due, he
may be still exposed to the trouble and
expense of suit. If the injured person's refusal of morally adequate reparation is unseasonable, and his pursuit of legal coercion
imposes unjust hardship, the conscientious
duty of restitution may suffer diminution
or may even be extinguished entirely.
The laws mentioned in the Cola Corporation problem specify the obligations of
the claimants under a general principle of
morals that those who invoke the aid of the
courts to enforce their rights shall do so on
the law's terms. Aside from considerations
of the basic justice of their claims, A, B,
and C, as persons who seek the law's aid,
are obliged to meet the law's requirements
in respect to making proper pleading, establishing the court's jurisdiction, showing the
adequacy of service, and suffering appeal
from the judgment of the trial court. These
requirements, in their fullness, are not man-
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datorily exacted by the law itself, for the
law empowers the defendant to waive some
of them. But a defendant has no moral duty
created by the law itself to make these
waivers. If he had such a duty in any case
it would arise from the moral obligation not
to diminish the recovery of a plaintiff whose
claim is certainly just, in its factual and
legal foundation and in the manner and
amount of its demand. The claims here are
not of this character, therefore the Cola
Corporation violates no moral obligation
in resisting them by refusing to exercise
the waivers to which the law empowers it.
It follows that the Corporation's act is
not evil in its moral object. The statement
suggests no intent, nor any indirect effect
or other circumstance, which would make
the concrete acts of the Corporation
morally evil.
Moral Effect of the Law of Infancy
in the White Co.'s Action Against
Mary Smith
This law empowers Mary Smith to avoid
her contract, made with the White Co., for
the conditional purchase of the 1956 car.
The power may be definitively exercised by
suit for rescission or by raising the defense
of infancy in suit brought by the Company
to enforce the contract. The direct legal
effects in either case are to extinguish those
duties of the parties which arose out of
their agreement, to oblige an adult party to
return to the infant all money and property
received under the contract, and to oblige
the infant to return to the other party all
money and property received under the
contract and which in one form or other
remains in the infant's hands. In some few
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jurisdictions, the infant cannot rescind if he
does not make the other entirely whole; in
a few others, the depreciation of property
held by the infant is charged off against the
money which the other must return to him.
Where the power of rescission is given in
respect of property contracts, the state is
unquestionably competent-in contrast to
the state's grant of power to avoid a contract of marriage valid ab initio, which is
incompetent as it is opposed to natural law.
The power of voiding property contracts
given to infants seems to be directed to the
common good, for it has the effect of making infants secure in their property rights,
even against the effects of their own immaturity and though there be no wrongful or
overreaching conduct in the other party.
The test of equitableness is better met
where the measure of the infant's recovery
is limited, at least to some extent, by considerations of deterioration or of the intangible benefits he has had from the contract. Yet the generally accepted measure
of recovery which so strongly favors the
infant is not radically inequitable, in view
of the opportunity everyone has to avoid
serious loss-by refusing to contract with
infants, except in respect of necessaries and
of items of small value.
If Mary Smith pleads the defense of infancy, the primary and secondary moral obligations relating to her dealings with the
White Co. will be extinguished. A just law
which empowers its subject to free himself
from legal obligations and which, upon his
doing so, imposes contrary legal and moral
obligations upon other persons, clearly extinguishes the moral obligations of the subject. If the law which empowers an infant
to avoid her contract did not release her
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moral obligations thereunder, the law
would be unjust and morally ineffective in
binding the other party to give up the benefits he has received under the contract.
Though the person who contracted in infancy has a primary moral duty to perform
her contract, it does not follow that she
acts wrongfully when she acts to obtain a
legally and morally effective release from
that obligation.
Therefore, the act of Mary Smith in
making the plea of infancy to avoid her
contract obligations to the White Co. will
not be evil in its moral object. We shall see
that Mary's act is not evil by reason of its
indirect effects or of her intent.
Moral Effect of the Statute of Frauds
in Jane's Contract Action Against
Mary Smith
The procedural laws make the protection
of the Statute of Frauds available to the
defendant who pleads the defense in answering a complaint which does not allege
a merely oral contract, or who shows the
legal inefficiency of a complaint which does
allege a merely oral contract.
There is some difficulty in determining
precisely the legal and moral status of a
contract which is within the Statute of
Frauds and is not conformed to the Statute's requirements. There are a few American jurisdictions in which the local statutes
declare "void" a contract such as Mary
Smith's oral agreement to buy Jane's $500
car. If our hypothetical jurisdiction has
such a statute and if its terms are most
strictly construed by the courts of that
jurisdiction, Mary's contract with Jane was
void ab initio. But such strict construction

of the Statute of Frauds, even in jurisdictions where the clause applicable to contracts for the sale of goods uses the word
"void," would be so unusual that the law
of our hypothetical jurisdiction must not
be assumed to have voided the problem
contract at its inception.
There is good warrant for the view which
holds that in most American jurisdictions,
a contract obnoxious to the Statute is voidable at the option of either party thereto,
and that this problem contract would have
been voided by Mary's refusal to purchase
the car as agreed. This view of the Statute's
legal effect seems to follow logically from
the holding of our courts with respect to the
measure of damages in such cases and with
respect to the title in goods transferred pursuant to a contract which is later repudiated. When either party to a contract for
the sale of goods repudiates the agreement,
title in the goods, if it had passed to the
buyer, revests in the seller. And it is said
that because the party repudiating a contract obnoxious to the Statute does no legal
wrong, the other cannot recover damages
upon the measure of his loss from the nonperformance, but only upon the reasonable
value of what he had done under the contract.
Yet we are not prepared to say that the
moral effect of the Statute of Frauds is free
of the requirement of good faith which the
moralists insist is necessary for the moral
effectiveness of laws which transfer property interests by prescription. An adverse
possessor of land does not make his title
morally good if he enters or occupies with
the consciousness of violating a moral duty.
We believe that one who repudiates a contract obnoxious to the Statute of Frauds,
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knowing that he is failing in the primary
moral duty of justice, does not obtain release from his moral obligations which
arose out of the contract. This matter differs in important aspects from the disaffirmance of an infant's contract. The law
of infancy, by giving the affirmative action
to disaffirm, indicates its intent to offer the
infant means to free himself entirely from
his contract burdens. The defensive aid
which the law gives to an infant who has
disaffirmed by nonperformance seems to be
offered as an alternative means, by which
the infant can free himself without assuming the burden of an affirmative suit. In
contrast, the intent of the Statute of Frauds
seems not be that of directly offering the
parties a means of achieving freedom from
obligation, but rather to save time and
trouble for the courts, and to penalize the
imprudent contractant who does not trouble
to get a memorandum of his agreement.
Therefore, we believe that while the disaffirming infant is not barred morally from
the act which will obtain for him a full
legal and moral discharge of his contract
duties, the person repudiating his obligations under an oral contract whose existence he does not question is acting in such
bad faith that he cannot benefit in the
moral order from a legal avoidance of his
contract.
And so we are of opinion that, in the
moral order at least, the Statute of Frauds
has only the effect of making unenforceable the obligations created by the oral
contract. Thus, it discharges the defendant from the secondary moral duty to
suffer the coercion incidental to the plaintiff's suit for specific performance or for the
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full measure of damages for the breach.
The defendant's good faith is not required
here, except to the extent that he shall not
destroy the written memorandum if one
exists, and he shall not, by lying, assert that
a lost memorandum never existed. If he
maintains this minimal good faith, he may
morally have the Statute's protection
against litigation of his opponent's larger
claims. He is still, in a proper case, subject to a quantum meruit action.
This effect of the Statute, to make the
larger claim unenforceable, is just and, so,
morally effective. If a law is justified by its
general effect, it does not lose its moral
force because, in a given case, the desired
effect is not achieved. It is said that the
section of the Statute of Frauds which
governs contracts for the sale of goods
serves the social need to avoid litigation of
commercial matters having slight significance in the society's economy and in the
economic security of its members in general, where the lack of written proofs
makes the legal process difficult, lengthy,
and uncertain. And this section's effects
seem not inequitable when one considers
that they follow only when the parties have
neglected to avail themselves of the easy
and commonly known means of a written
memorandum to protect their rights. Reasonable arguments have been made to the
contrary, urging that the general effect of
the Statute is inequitable and adverse to
the common good. But where the over-all
effect of an existing law is not clearly and
certainly shown to be contrary to the common good, or seriously inequitable, one
who applies the law must hold it just, in
accordance with the presumption of recti-
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tude in the legislature's exercise of political
wisdom. It is true, of course, that the judicial or legislative lawmaker may properly
alter the law on a merely probable showing that the law is inequitable or does not
promote the common good.
That Mary Smith made a lying and slanderous excuse for breaking this contract,
may reasonably be taken to indicate that
she repudiated the agreement with a subjective conviction that she was doing a
moral wrong. Her repudiation and her
present plea will not release her from her
primary moral obligation to perform her
agreement, or from her primary moral obligation to repair the damage Jane has suffered by Mary's morally wrongful refusal
to purchase the car.
Yet Mary does no moral wrong, per se,
in refusing to suffer the legal coercion incidental to Jane's suit upon this contract. If
Mary had persuaded Jane that no memorandum was necessary, one could readily
see why Mary should not now plead the
Statute of Frauds to get the benefit of her
own deceit. But where it is Jane's own
ignorance or negligence which has occasioned Mary's power to avoid suit, it is
hard to say that Mary's employment of
that power is an act immoral in its very
object.
Of course, Mary's plea of the Statute is
evil in this case if we assume, as the statement seems to warrant, that Mary intends
to give Jane nothing unless she is legally
compelled to do so. Here, Mary's act is
morally vitiated by her evil intent and by
the evil indirect effect that Jane's damage,
for which Mary has full moral responsibility, will not be repaired.

Moral Effect of the Statutes of
Limitation in the Contract Actions
of the White Co. and of Jane Against
Mary Smith, in the Tort Action of
Jane Against Mary, and in the
Actions in Debt and Foreclosure
Against John Jones
The plea of the Statute of Limitations, in
its effectiveness to extinguish moral obligations, is similar to the plea of the Statute of
Frauds and quite unlike the plea of infancy.
The infancy plea extinguishes all secondary
moral obligations, and even those primary
obligations which arose out of the rescinded
contract. But the moral effect of the plea of
limitations is limited, like that of the plea of
the Statute of Frauds. When he successfully
pleads limitations, the defendant is freed
only of his moral obligation to suffer the
coercive process by which the claim made
against him might have been adjudicated.
Armed with the final judgment which
recognizes the validity of his statutory defense, he can prevent the plaintiff from
having trial and judgment upon the claim
against whose litigation the period of limitation has run. Of course, if the plaintiff
has had judgment upon his principal cause
of action, and it is only an action upon the
judgment that is barred by limitations, the
moral obligations imposed by the just judgment will not be extinguished by the interposition of the plea of limitations in a supplementary proceeding.
It is sometimes said that the running of
the Statute of Limitations extinguishes substantive legal rights. That statement, if it be
taken literally, involves the fallacy of "Post
hoc, ergo propter hoc." Substantive rights
are, in some cases, extinguished at the same
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moment that the period of limitations, applicable to an action to enforce those rights,
expires. But the failure of the remedy does
not cause to be extinguished the right which
the remedy was given to enforce. The classic case is that of adverse possession of
realty. It is not the Statute of Limitations,
but some other statute or some judge-made
law which extinguishes title in the "owner"
and creates title in the "occupier."
Moral obligations, whether they were
created by the acts of the parties under
moral law alone, or by the acts of the parties under a just human law, can be extinguished by human law. But that can be done
only by a competent and just human law
which operates to impose obligations contrary to the pre-existing obligations.
Moral obligations which are primaryarising without the aid of human lawspersist whether the human law always declined to enforce them or, having once offered to enforce them, now withdraws its
offer. Moral obligations correlative to moral
rights acquired by compliance with competent and just human law endure in the
moral order, though the human law later
refuse to coerce their performance. Of
course, if one has not availed himself of a
human law by whose operation legally coercible moral obligations could have been
imposed upon a person subject to that law,
and the legal system now makes its coercive
process unavailable for that purpose, the
moral obligation in question cannot now be
created.
Jurisprudential concepts closely parallel
to those stated here premise the constitutional doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of
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Campbell v. Holt' and elaborated in other
cases and in other courts. A statute which
revives a cause of action outlawed by limitations must be predicated upon the assumption that the substantive rights which
the action enforces survived when the enforcing action was outlawed.
The legislature is competent to revive a
cause of action outlawed by the statute of
limitations, except in those cases where a
contrary obligation respecting the same
subject matter has become coercible by reason of the expiration of the period of limitation. Revival statutes are incompetent
when the outlawed action is one to recover
real or personal property. In this latter context, there are given to the possessor causes
of action which secure his enjoyment of the
property against the owner, and the actions
are given to the possessor in the very instant
in which the owner's causes against the possessor are barred by limitations.
In none of the actions here considered as
affected by statutes of limitation does the
law give to the defendant, by reason of the
expiration of the period of limitation, a
cause of action to enforce against the plaintiff an obligation contrary to the obligation
which the plaintiff's action sought to coerce.
None of these actions pertinent to the problems proposed is an action to recover property, real or personal. This is obvious with
respect to the actions which seek damages
for breach of contract or for tort, and with
respect to the debt action of Jones's mortgagee. The foreclosure action, if we may
assume that judgment for the mortgagee
would have the effect of requiring a sale of

115 U. S. 620 (1885).
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the property, is not a possessory action.
And in nearly all of our States, that is the
effect of foreclosure.
The running of the statute on the mortgagee's action to foreclose does not, in and
of itself, cancel the mortgagee's lien of record. The power given to the mortgagee by
the recording act, to have his lien recorded,
and the right which the law secures to him,
to have that record stand until removed by
his executing a satisfaction piece or by decree of court, are a legal power and a legal
right coercive of the mortgagor's obligation
to pay his debt. They have value to the
mortgagee even after his action in foreclosure is barred by limitations, because they
make it possible for him to bargain for settlement of the debt by offering a satisfaction
piece which will clear the mortgagor's title
and give it a better market value. This
power and right are not extinguished by the
running of limitations, but the expiration of
the period of limitations is taken as a starting point by the statute which gives the
mortgagor an action to have cancelled the
record lien. It is important to observe that
neither this statute nor judgment for the
mortgagor in an action thereunder imposes
any obligation which is contrary to the
mortgagor's obligation to pay his debt.
Further, the action given by this statute is
not an action for possession of property.
Therefore, in these cases, the expiration
of the several periods of limitation has only
the effect of empowering the defendants to
prevent enforcement against them of the
plaintiffs' claims. The only moral obligations discharged by the running of these
periods are the defendants' secondary moral
obligations to suffer the lawful coercions

incidental to adjudication of the plaintiffs'
claims.
No one has, from natural law, power to
enforce his claim by an action at law. He
has that power, if at all, by gift of competent human law. A human law which is not
just is incompetent to extinguish a moral
right acquired by exercise of a legal power,
but even an unjust law is effective to limit
or revoke a legal power it has created. The
law of limitations does not directly revoke
or limit the power to enforce a claim by an
action at law, it does so by empowering the
defendant to bar enforcement of the claim.
The defendant, exercising this power, never
does a wrongful act per se, for he does not
directly deprive the claimant of anything
which the law cannot take from him at will.
The defendant's act of exercising this power
may well be wrongful in the concrete-it is
so when he acts with morally evil intent, or
in disregard of his moral duty to prevent
the evil effect which his act indirectly produces in a given case. But his act is not
morally evil in its object.
It does not appear that the statutes of
limitation applicable in these problem cases
are unjust. The state is not bound to enforce every moral obligation at all costs. If
the enforcement involves proportionately
great harm to the common good, the state
need not impose it, or having imposed it
may justly give a defense to bar it. Long
delayed litigation harms the common good,
because it makes for insecurity of the citizens in their enjoyment of property and in
their exercise of enterprise, and also because it creates unreasonable difficulties for
the defendants and for the courts by raising
questions at a time when the pertinent
proofs may well have been lost, partially or
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entirely. A limitation is not inequitable if
the period allowed is reasonably long with
respect to the subject matter. In those tort
matters where the element of causality is
not susceptible of a clear proof even a few
years after the event, shorter periods are
not inequitable.
Therefore the acts, by which the defendants in our hypotheticals will invoke the
defense of the Statute of Limitations, are
not evil in their moral objects. When the
several actions are thus terminated the parties' secondary moral obligations will be
extinguished, but their primary moral obligations will not be affected.

Moral Effects of the Statute Which
Gives John Jones an Action to Have
Cancelled of Record the Lien of an
Outlawed, Though Unpaid Mortgage
Obviously the right of a mortgagee to
maintain his record lien, even after his action on the debt and his foreclosure action
have been outlawed by limitations, is a
valuable right. It enables him to bargain
for a compromise of the debt when the
mortgagor desires to clear his record title.
In the ordinary actions given an owner of
real property to remove the record lien as a
cloud on his title, the statutes or the courts
in most of our states require that the owner
offer proof that the debt underlying the lien
has been paid in fact. We shall assume that
in Jones's state the usual actions to quiet
title require proof that the debt has been
fully paid.
Jones's state gives a statutory action to
cancel of record the lien of his mortgagee.
To give substance to the problem we must
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assume that the statute of the hypothetical
state is similar to some actual statute. We
will assume that Jones's action is given by
a statute similar to Section 500 of the New
York Real Property Law, as that Section
has stood since the amendment of 1948
added Subdivision (4). That subdivision
gives, in specific terms, an action to cancel
and discharge of record a mortgage where
the action to foreclose is outlawed by limitations, unless the mortgagee or his successor shall be in possession of the property at
the time the plaintiff's action is commenced.
The subdivision declares that payment or
non-payment of the mortgage debt shall be
immaterial.
The statutory action seems to extinguish
justly the corporate mortgagee's valuable
right to maintain the record lien. The mortgagee's right arose under the state's recording act. This right has natural law content
only in virtue of the general principle which
empowers civil society to coerce performance of the natural moral obligation of debt
which arose when Jones took ownership of
the real property from the Corporation
without paying the full price, and promised
to pay the balance upon the terms of the
mortgage. The statement does not suggest
that Jones, in his mortgage agreements, undertook to let the record lien stand until he
paid the debt. We may assume that the
statute which creates Jones's action to
cancel the record lien is a just law, not incompetent, and directed equitably to the
common good. The mortgagee's right was
created by coercive law, and that law is
competent to extinguish it. The extinction
of the right is directed to the common good
as it serves the social interest in the free
alienability of real property. It has the same
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equitableness as the statute of limitations
which extinguishes the mortgagee's rights to
have coercion of the debt obligation by actions on the bond and to foreclose. That the
statute tends to foster injustice where it
gives the action for cancellation of the lien
to the original mortgagor could be argued
reasonably, yet that conclusion seems to us
not so compellingly certain as to override
the presumption that the legislature has
acted justly, at least within the limits of political wisdom, by abolishing a right which
its predecessors created when they passed
the recording acts.
Therefore the moral object of Jones's act
in commencing the statutory action is not
evil. The decree he seeks will not, however,
alter or extinguish his moral obligation to
pay the balance of his debt.
Jones's mortgage is not "void upon its
face." The dissolution of a corporation does
not extinguish its property rights or its
choses in action. For purposes of enforcing
debts and other obligations due a corporation, the corporation is held to survive dissolution and a receiver is empowered to
obtain enforcement. Assets thus realized are
distributed to the corporation's creditors or
successors, as their interests may appear.
Conclusions as to the Cola
Corporation Attorney
We have shown the moral righteousness
of the corporation's conduct in refusing to
waive its procedural rights in the suits
brought by A and B, and in deciding to appeal the judgment given in C's favor. There
is therefore, no question of their attorney
cooperating in a client's wrongdoing. Nor
does it appear that the attorney's act is evil

in its object, in its accidental circumstances,
or in his intent.
One caveat is offered. If the attorney employs fraud, chicane, or even frivolity in the
delaying tactics by which he seeks to advance his client's causes, his will embraces
the moral evil which characterizes these
expedients.
Conclusions as to Mary Smith's
Administrator
The
science,
actions
Smith's
against

administrator may, in good conplead the defenses proposed in the
which will have survived Mary
death and which will be brought
her estate.

The administrator's conduct does not
come under the moral rules which govern
cooperation in the wrongdoing of another.
He is acting in his own name, though fiduciary duties limit the freedom he would
have if he acted in his own personal interest.
We have established that pleading the
several defenses in the actions which will be
brought against the Smith estate is not conduct evil in its moral object. To perform
his duties as a fiduciary, and to earn his
fees, must be assumed to be the intent of
the administrator's activities-that intent is
not morally evil, indeed it is virtuous, in
some degree at least. Moral circumstances,
accidental to the object of his acts, in
which the will of the man who is administrator may embrace evil, do not appearunless his acts have some evil indirect effect
which he is morally obliged to prevent. The
acts by which the administrator will make
the defenses will not, of course, prevent the
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White Company from recovering the car
Mary Smith purchased from them, nor will
they prevent the Company from retaining
enough of her payments to cover the car's
depreciation, if the rule of the Smith jurisdiction so provides. The administrator's intervention will prevent the recovery of
damages by the White Co. and by Jane.
Under the survival acts, the contract actions can be brought against the estate of
the decedent, and the estate has the secondary moral obligation to suffer the legal
coercion incidental to prosecution of these
actions. The acts by which the administrator will interpose the defenses of infancy in
the White Co. action and that of the Statute
of Frauds in Jane's contract action are acts
not evil in their moral object. We may
safely assume that the administrator will act
without evil intent. Judgment for the estate
will discharge its secondary moral obligations and will direct return of the 1956 car
to the White Co. The administrator's interposition of the defenses may have evil indirect effects-neither the Company nor Jane
will be compensated for any damages Mary
culpably caused them. But the administrator has no moral duty to prevent these
effects because he has no opportunity of
preventing them. The law will not permit
him to pay out moneys of the estate to
satisfy claimants who cannot legally establish their claims, and if the administrator
fails to make the defenses available to the
estate he will be removed and the defenses
entered by his successor.
Therefore, the administrator's acts, by
which he will interpose the several defenses
are not morally evil, in their objects, in
their indirect effects or other accidental
circumstances, or in his intent.
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Conclusions as to Mary Smith's
Attorney
In a moral evaluation, the acts by which
the attorney will plead the several defenses
in Mary Smith's behalf must be viewed as
acts by which he cooperates in her wrongdoing, and as acts from which there will
follow evil indirect effects as to Jane.
It seems clear that Mary Smith is determined not to pay anything to the White Co.
or to Jane, unless she is legally compelled
to do so. On the other hand, Mary Smith's
primary moral obligations bind her to repair harm she has caused efficaciously,
unjustly, and with that malice which is described as theological fault.
Mary appears to have no moral duty to
make restitution of harm to the White Co.
She refused to perform her contract with
them, but because of the law of infancy her
refusal had the character of a disaffirmance
which is effective in the moral order to free
her of the obligations which arose from that
contract. Her remaining duty is to return
their car which was the subject of the contract, and she is prepared to do that.
On the other hand, it is apparent that
Mary is morally bound to make restitution
of the damages Jane suffered when Mary
refused to buy Jane's sedan as she had
agreed to do. This breach, in spite of the
possible legal effectiveness of the Statute of
Frauds to avoid the contract, did not release Mary from her contract obligations.
That Mary lyingly excused her act indicates
that she knew she was violating Jane's
strict rights. In the circumstances, she must
have foreseen that her refusal to buy the
car would cause some loss to Jane.
Mary must have foreseen also that the
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lie she told would unjustly harm Jane, so
Mary is bound to repair the harm she
caused in this respect as well.
The moral principles which govern cooperation in wrongdoing and acts which
have indirect evil effects must be applied
to this situation in order to determine
whether the attorney is permitted morally
to undertake Mary Smith's defense.
He will plead the legal defenses in her
behalf. In discussing the moral effects of the
law of infancy, the Statute of Frauds and
the Statute of Limitations, it has been
shown that to plead these defenses is not
an act morally evil in its object.
The attorney will act without evil intent. It does not appear that he desires
Mary to evade her moral duties, nor does
it seem that he wishes Jane to be deprived
of what is justly hers. His intent, as far as
appears, is to keep the good will of his
client, Mary Smith's father.
The attorney is certainly aware that Mary
intends to evade her moral obligations, and
he must know that Jane will get no restitution if Mary succeeds in defending these
actions. Thus, he foresees that his act of
defending Mary Smith will aid Mary's
wrongdoing and will result in Jane's unjust
deprivation.
In this situation, it remains to inquire
whether the attorney has such reasonable
and proportionate cause for undertaking
Mary's defense as will morally warrant him
in cooperating with Mary's wrongful conduct and in permitting Jane to suffer harm.
The hardship he will suffer by refusing to
defend Mary Smith must be weighed
against the evil of Mary's conduct and the
evil Jane will suffer.

In this case the causal relation between
the attorney's act and the evils which will
follow upon it is quite close, and it is practically certain that if he defends Mary
Smith she will realize her evil intent to give
Jane nothing. We will take that Mr. Smith
will no longer retain the attorney if he refuses to defend Mary. Thus, our examination of reasonable and proportionate cause
is reduced to a comparison between the
act the attorney is asked to perform and the
hardship his refusal must entail, on the one
hand, and Mary's malice and Jane's loss, on
the other.
Mary is violating very serious and very
strict moral obligations imposed by the virtues of veracity and justice. On the attorney's side, it should be pointed out that the
act he is contemplating is a usual and customary one in his profession. As such, it
needs less justification than if he were to
undertake, in behalf of this wrongdoer,
some quite extraordinary assistance. While
Jane's loss may be very considerable, the
attorney's loss of his retaining client deserves special weight because it will affect
quite directly his means of livelihood.
It is, therefore, our opinion that the attorney will not act immorally if he undertakes Mary Smith's defense.
We believe, however, that the attorney
has a clear duty to call to the attention
of Mary Smith and her father the malice of
her dispositions, and the grave injustice of
their effects on Jane. He should urge that
Mary acknowledge her misrepresentation of
Jane's character, that Mary or her father
help Jane to get back her job or to find new
employment, and that they make some fair
compensation to Jane for the material harm
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she has suffered. This duty-if Mary Smith
and her father are not utterly unreasonable
people-involves no serious hardship or
risk of hardship for the attorney.
Conclusions as to the Attorney
for John Jones
Since it appears that Jones's act of bringing suit for a decree cancelling the record
lien is not evil in its object, we need examine only his intent and his act's indirect
effects-no other accidental moral circumstances of his act appear to be evil.
Clearly, Jones's intent is not to pay the
balance of his debt at this time. It is not
clear whether he intends ever to pay that
balance in full. Jones has a duty to seek out
his creditor, but he does not have a duty,
at this time, to pay anything to or make a
composition with any person-for it does
not now appear who is entitled to receive
payment of the debt or to forgive any part
of it. The moral title to demand or forgive
the debt will depend upon the law and the
facts pertinent to the financial position of
the dissolved corporation and to Richard
Roe's decedent estate.
It seems quite certain that Jones has not
been, up to now, discharged of his debt
obligation or of any part thereof. If Thomas
Roe, as his refusal to deal with Jones seems
to indicate, has renounced any inheritance
of A.B.C., Inc. stock, his refusal to help
Jones get a release and effectuate payment
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is not an act binding upon the corporation
or its successors. On the other hand, Alfred's offer to settle with Jones was conditional, and its condition precedent was not
fulfilled, so that offer could not discharge
Jones, even partially.
Whether or not the success of Jones's
statutory action will have the indirect effect of depriving the corporation and its
successors of any payment upon the debt
Jones morally owes, is quite uncertain.
We can only say that Jones's attorney
should question the client as to his intentions. If Jones seems inclined to perform
his moral duties as they may appear upon
honest and competent investigation and
negotiation, the attorney may commence
the action. If that is not Jones's disposition,
we believe that the attorney should not concur in the act of Jones, which will be wrongful because of its certain or probable, and
seriously evil, indirect effects. The person
or persons entitled will lose all hope of payment or compromise of Jones's debt which
amounts to at least $3,500. The attorney's
hardship, the loss of a fee which must be,
in comparison with the creditor's loss, very
small, seems not to warrant the attorney's
cooperation in Jones's unjust and uncharitable act. Though the attorney is not bound
in justice to safeguard the mortgagee, he
has an obligation of charity to refrain,
when no proportionate hardship is involved, from acts harmful to others.

